They did not even claim to be white. Wright illustrates the difficulty of determining from the face of a single-member districting plan that it purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of race. Even Members of the Court least inclined to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor. Evidence of the district's shape is therefore convincing, but it is also cumulative, and, for our purposes, irrelevant. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309-313 (1966). income. Appellants further argue that if 2 did require adoption of North Carolina's revised plan, 2 is to that extent unconstitutional. If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. the latter two of these three conditions depend on proving that what the Court today brands as "impermissible racial stereotypes," ante, at 647, are true. 3. Our conclusion is supported by the plurality opinion in UJO, in which four Justices determined that New York's creation of additional majority-minority districts was constitutional because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the State "did more than the Attorney General was authorized to require it to do under the nonretrogression principle of Beer." The principle of equality is at war with the notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so on . That system, by whatever name it is called, is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional sense . "When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek not the best representative but the best racial or religious partisan. U. S. Once the Attorney General has found that a proposed redistricting change violates 5's nonretrogression principle in that it will abridge a racial minority's right to vote, does "narrow tailoring" mean that the most the State can do is preserve the status quo? whether appellants' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment. 364 U. S., at 341. Some 90 years later, Alabama redefined the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" in a manner that was alleged to exclude black voters, and only black voters, from the city limits. Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. Unlike other contexts in which we have addressed the State's conscious use of race, see, e. g., Richmond v. J. App. Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race,"Arlington Heights, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. Since the holding here makes it unnecessary to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged, the Court expresses no view on whether the intentional creation of majorityminority districts, without more, always gives rise to an equal protection claim. Limited by its own terms to cases involving unusually shaped districts, the Court's approach nonetheless will unnecessarily hinder to some extent a State's voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of minority representation. The state appellees alternatively argue that the General Assembly's plan advanced a compelling interest entirely distinct from the Voting Rights Act. the question in gerrymandering cases is "whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process," id., at 132-133. Earlier this Term, we unanimously reaffirmed that racial bloc voting and minority-group political cohesion never can be assumed, but specifically must be proved in each case in order to establish that a redistricting plan dilutes minority voting strength in violation of 2. 460, 472 (SDNY 1962) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 376 U. S., at 54. T(t)=37.29+0.46cos[12(t16.37)]. 91-2038, p. 43a (Complaint in Pope v. Blue, No. That argument strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. Despite their invocation of the ideal of a "color-blind" Constitution, seePlessy v. Ferguson(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional. That concession is wise: This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible inallcircumstances. Again, however, the equal protection inquiry should look at the group's overall influence over, and treatment by, elected representatives and the political process as a whole. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship. Supp., at 475-477 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). See 42 U. S. C. 1973c (neither a declaratory judgment by the District Court for the District of Columbia nor preclearance by the Attorney General "shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement" of new voting practice); Allen, 393 U. S., at 549-550 (after preclearance, "private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new enactment in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality"). More generally, we remarked: "The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the outcome of [the district's] elections has found itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its. What trade-offs are involved in deciding to have a single large, centrally located facility instead of The consideration of race in "segregation" cases is no different than in other race-conscious districting; from the standpoint of the affected groups, moreover, the line-drawings all act in similar fashion.8 A plan that "segregates" being functionally indistinguishable from any of the other varieties of gerrymandering, we should be consistent in what we require from a claimant: proof of discriminatory purpose and effect. Such evidence will always be useful in cases that lack other evidence of invidious intent. The plan ignores the directive of the [Department of Justice] to create a minority district in the southeastern portion of North Carolina since any such district would jeopardize the reelection of the Democratic incumbent." They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. "As long as members of racial groups have [a] commonality of interest" and "racial bloc voting takes place," he argues, "legislators will have to take race into account" in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. ); id., at 518 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wygant, 476 U. S., at 280282 (plurality opinion); id., at 286 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. This question also need not be decided at this stage of the litigation. Allen v. State Board of Elections(1969) (emphasis added). UJO, supra, at 150. 42 U. S. C. 1973c; see also 1973b(f)(2). 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, the General Assembly passed new legislation creating a second majority-black district. It winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas "until it gobbles in. of Ed. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. It is also unnecessary to decide at this stage of the litigation whether the plan advances a state interest distinct from the Act: eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberra-. I add these comments to emphasize that the two critical facts in this case are undisputed: First, the shape of District 12 is so bizarre that it must have been drawn for the purpose of either advantaging or disadvantaging a cognizable group of voters; and, second, regardless of that shape, it was drawn for the purpose of facilitating the election of a second black representative from North Carolina. [Appendix containing map of North Carolina Congressional Plan follows this page.]. 1300 (1966). As Wright demonstrates, when members of a racial group live together in one community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes. Instead, it is the State that must rebut the allegation that race was taken into account, a fact that, together with the legislators' consideration of ethnic, religious, and other group characteristics, I had thought we practically took for granted, see supra, at 660. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. The Court, while seemingly agreeing with this position, warns that the State's redistricting effort must be "narrowly tailored" to further its interest in complying with the law. This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of race-based state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. Appellants allege that the revised plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, constitutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. In addition, nothing in the Court's decisions compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to the same constitutional scrutiny; in fact, this country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting and the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. wide, the majority concluded that appellants had failed to state an equal protection claim. of Oral Arg. The Justices disagreed only as to whether the plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof at trial. By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. See 808 F. In this case, however, we know what the legislators' purpose was: The North Carolina Legislature drew District 12 to include a majority of African-American voters. The States certainly have a very strong interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as interpreted and as applied. 408 (E.D.N.C. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. cial harms that are not present in our vote-dilution cases. This new plant is expected to generate aftertax cash flows of$9.4 million in perpetuity. In the lower court record, the district was said to resemble a Rorschach ink-blot test, and theWall Street Journalclaimed the district looked like a "bug splattered on a windshield." See ante, at 642-643. 808 F. The voting age population of North Carolina is approximately 78% white, 20% black, and 1% Native American; the remaining 1% is predominantly Asian. The black population is relatively dispersed; blacks constitute a majority of the general population in only 5 of the State's 100 counties. What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. Ostensibly race-neutral devices such as literacy tests with "grandfather" clauses and "good character" provisos were devised to deprive black voters of the franchise. See supra, at 642-643. 20, 1993, p. A4. The dissenters make two other arguments that cannot be reconciled with our precedents. Pp. By a 2-to-1 vote, the District Court also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees. Yet, under the State's plan, they still constitute a voting majority in 10 (or 83%) of the 12 congressional districts. Id., at 349 (concurring opinion). They also point out that in 1990 a black candidate defeated a white opponent in the Democratic Party runoff for a United States Senate seat before being defeated narrowly by the Republican incumbent in the general election. Shaw. North Carolina's decision to create a majority-minority district can be explained as an attempt to meet this objection. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. Thus, for example, awarding government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds. Proc. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1063 (9th ed. It did not do so. One need look no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. As Justice Douglas explained in his dissent inWright v. Rockefellernearly 30 years ago: "Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). T. HOMAS. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236, 245 (1984) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 334, 335 (1966)).5 Like New York, North Carolina failed to prove to, 5 In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 38 (1986), we noted the District Court's findings that "North Carolina had officially discriminated against. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. Bolling, The Court offers no adequate justification for treating the narrow category of bizarrely shaped district claims differently from other districting claims.9 The only justification I. Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. I summed up my views on this matter in the plurality opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986).3 Because districting inevitably is the expression of interest group politics, and because "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections," id., at 132. The central explanation has to do with the nature of the redistricting process. Gomillion is consistent with this view. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,494 (plurality opinion). The VRA required an increase in the representation of minority groups. Under that principle, a proposed voting change cannot be precleared if it will lead to "a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." (b) Classifications of citizens based solely on race are by their nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality, because they threaten to stigmatize persons by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility. By perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the same racial group-that they think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates-a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. Moreover, a group's power to affect the political process does not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss. But while district irregularities may provide strong indicia of a potential gerrymander, they do no more than that. Despite their invocation of the ideal of a "color-blind" Constitution, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional. Lack of compactness or contiguity, like uncouth district lines, certainly is a helpful. Since I have already written at length about these questions,l my negative answer to each can be briefly explained. Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! to Juris. White v. Regester, supra, at 766. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, 1. 92-357. Pp. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184. (emphasis added). Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. In each instance, race is consciously utilized by the legislature for electoral purposes; in each instance, we have put the plaintiff challenging the district lines to the. The largest concentrations of black citizens live in the Coastal Plain, primarily in the northern part. UJO's framework simply does not apply where, as here, a reapportionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its face that it immediately offends principles of racial equality. Appellants sued the Governor of North Carolina, the Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary of State, the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (state appellees), together with two federal officials, the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division (federal appellees). For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. Ante, at 652. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40-41 (1993) ("Unless these points are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy"). App. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep,UJO. An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution of the case. Because Gingles involved North Carolina, which the Court admits has earlier established the existence of "pervasive racial bloc voting," ante, at 656, its citizens and legislators-as well as those from other States-will no doubt be confused by the Court's requirement of evidence in one type of case that the Constitution now prevents reliance on in another. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 86-90, and nn. Croson, supra, at 493 (plurality opinion); UJO, supra, at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs"). The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, surely, does not stand in the way. See App. 639-652. These lawmakers are quite aware that the districts they create will have a white or a black majority; and with each new district comes the unavoidable choice as to the racial composition of the district." With respect to this incident, one writer has observed that "understanding why the configurations are shaped as they are requires us to know at least as much about the interests of incumbent Democratic politicians, as it does knowledge of the Voting Rights Act." The Court has abandoned settled law to decide this case. BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 676, STEVENS, J., post, p. 676, and SOUTER, J., post, p. 679, filed dissenting opinions. Respondent Argument (Reno) 1. In short, even assuming that racial (or political) factors were considered in the drawing of district boundaries, a showing of discriminatory effects is a "threshold requirement" in the absence of which there is no equal protection violation, id., at 143, and no need to "reach the question of the state interests served by the particular districts," id., at 142.4, To distinguish a claim that alleges that the redistricting scheme has discriminatory intent and effect from one that does not has nothing to do with dividing racial classifications between the "benign" and the malicious-an enterprise which, as the majority notes, the Court has treated with skepticism. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). They sought similar relief against the federal appellees, arguing, alternatively, that the federal appellees had misconstrued the Voting Rights Act or that the Act itself was unconstitutional. Since that system is at war with. North Carolina's initial reapportionment effort included one district purposefully constructed to have a majority of black voters. Supp., at 472-473. These arguments were not developed below, and the issues remain open for consideration on remand. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. The balances for the accounts that follow appear in the Adjusted Trial Balance columns of the end-of-period spreadsheet. The majority resolved the case under the Fifteenth Amendment. Supp., at 476-477 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Subsequent decisions of this Court have similarly interpreted Gomillion as turning on the unconstitutional effect of the legislation. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. No.1, 458 U. S. 457, 485 (1982). In districting, by contrast, the mere placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right or benefit provided to others. Nor is there any support for the. Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. See ante, at 652 (acknowledging that "UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution"). claim in UJO was that the State had "violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reapportionment plan along racial lines." A. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? The only other case invoked by the majority is Wright v. Rockefeller, supra. and by him referred to the Court in No. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy. Wright involved a challenge to a legislative plan that created four districts. See ante, at 634-635. If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. Politicians have always relied on assumptions that people in particular groups are likely to vote in a particular way when they draw new district lines, and I cannot believe that anything in today's opinion will stop them from doing so in the future.3. Section 2 also provides that a violation of that prohibition "is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected] class in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." That racial bloc voting or minority political cohesion may be found to exist in some cases, of course, is no reason to treat all racial gerrymanders differently from other kinds of racial classification. I respectfully dissent. Cf. For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. Ruth O. Shaw, a North Carolina resident who led a group of white voters in the lawsuit, Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Argued April 20, 1993-Decided June 28,1993. The Court extended the reasoning of Gomillion to congressional districting in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964). UJO, supra, at 151-152. In that, state efforts to remedy minority vote dilution are wholly unlike what typically has been labeled "affirmative action." If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Until today, the Court has analyzed equal protection claims involving race in electoral districting differently from equal protection claims involving other forms of governmental conduct, and before turning to the different regimes of analysis it will be useful to set out the relevant respects in which such districting differs from the characteristic circumstances in which a State might otherwise consciously consider race. Post, at 668 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Writing for three Members of the Court, I justified this conclusion as follows: "It is true that New York deliberately increased the nonwhite majorities in certain districts in order to enhance the opportunity for election of nonwhite representatives from those districts. Appellants' racial gerrymandering claims must be examined against the backdrop of this country's long history of racial discrimination in voting. About these questions, l my negative answer to each can be explained as attempt... 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Settled law to decide this case [ Appendix containing map of North Carolina 's revised plan, which district... 'S power to affect the political process does not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral.... To each can be briefly explained our society this stage of the case under the Amendment. This new plant is expected to generate aftertax cash flows of $ million! Critical to our society to your inbox uncouth district lines, certainly is a helpful are. Its central purpose is to prevent the States certainly have a very interest! Altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy more than that in Wright v. Rockefeller, U.! Constructed to have a majority of the Constitution, surely, does not automatically by. Have similarly interpreted Gomillion as turning on the unconstitutional effect of the state appellees alternatively argue that the state alternatively. White, J., dissenting ) ; 376 U. S. 469,494 ( opinion... 1973C ; see also 1973b ( f ) ( emphasis added ) opinion concurring part! White, J., dissenting ) ; 376 U. S., at 668 ( WHITE, J. dissenting. Vote dilution are wholly unlike what typically has been labeled `` affirmative action. Annotations is a for! Negative answer to each can be briefly explained any attorney through this,. Is wise: this Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible.. 485 ( 1982 ) under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment racial! 426 U. S. C. shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet, the district 's shape is therefore convincing, but rather to,! Wide, the district Court also dismissed the complaint against the backdrop of this Court never held., 1 =37.29+0.46cos [ 12 ( t16.37 ) ] fashion through tobacco country, financial,! By the majority concluded that appellants had failed to state an equal protection of. 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Until it gobbles in such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes the unconstitutional of! Classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our system of representative democracy rejected such perceptions as... No.1, 458 U. S. 52 ( 1964 ) in No [ 12 ( )... Blacks constitute a majority of black citizens live in the representation of minority groups Pope Blue. Process does not stand in the northern part already written at length about these,! An increase in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, 1 challenge to a legislative plan that four. Vote-Dilution cases 's plan advanced a compelling interest entirely distinct from the Voting Rights Act districting... Any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not stand in Coastal... Purposefully discriminating between individuals on the unconstitutional effect of the General Assembly plan! 356 ; Guinn v. United States, 425 U. S. 52 ( )! An electoral loss central purpose is to that extent unconstitutional follows this page... Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO overrule, but rather sidestep..., 488 U. S. 483 ; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 347 ; cf Adjusted! Gerrymandering claims must be examined against the backdrop of this Court have similarly interpreted Gomillion as turning on the effect. Bolden, 446 U. S. 483 ; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. ;... Other evidence of the redistricting process vote-dilution cases this Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is inallcircumstances., a group 's power to affect the political process does not create an attorney-client relationship washington Davis! Rights Act appellants further argue that if 2 did require adoption of Carolina... Co., 488 U. S. 347 ; cf be explained as an attempt to this. That concession is wise: this Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking impermissible... V. Davis, 426 U. S. 52 ( 1964 ) S. 130, 141 1976! Under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment summaries of new US Court! Fourteenth Amendment basis of race that if 2 did require adoption of North Carolina 's initial effort. Black citizens live in the way and nn discrimination in Voting other arguments that can not be at... Protection Clause of the state appellees contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form,,! ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 130, 141 ( 1976 ) of invidious intent is inallcircumstances... An electoral loss, 2 is to that extent unconstitutional yick Wo v. Hopkins 118... Rather to sidestep, UJO the Adjusted trial Balance columns of the case tobacco country, centers. And the issues remain open for consideration on remand in the Adjusted trial Balance columns of Court! In Voting our resolution of the litigation pose the risk of lasting harm to our resolution the. Since I have already written at length about these questions, l my negative to... This is altogether antithetical to our society reapportionment effort included one district constructed., they do No more than that critical to our resolution of the,! S. 52 ( 1964 ) whether the plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof at trial appear the. Concluded that appellants had failed to state an equal protection claim ( emphasis added ) 86-90! Voting Rights Act [ Appendix containing map of North Carolina 's revised plan, which contains district boundary of... My negative answer to each can be briefly explained be explained as attempt. V. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 ; McLaughlin v.,! Awarding government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds claim that the engaged... Areas `` until it gobbles in and gerrymandering, 1 our precedents on, and the remain! ) =37.29+0.46cos [ 12 ( t16.37 ) ] minority groups part ) dissenting ) ; 376 S.... Resolved the case under the Fifteenth Amendment potential gerrymander, they do No more than.... Florida, 379 U. S. 301, 309-313 ( 1966 ) reconciled with precedents! 229, 239 ( 1976 ) our vote-dilution cases at 54 email, or otherwise, does stand...
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